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Abstract: Brexit poses two main challenges for the EU: an immediate challenge, and a 
longer-term one. The immediate challenge concerns whether the Article 50 negotiations 
will lead to the signing of an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis, as a cliff edge 
scenario would cause enormous immediate damage to sectors exposed to international co-
operation both in the EU and the UK. In the longer term, Brexit would inevitably force the 
EU to face a fundamental choice between pursuing further and deeper integration or 
putting it on hold, or even reversing it in certain areas. Since negotiations on the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU and those on the EU’s next multiannual financial 
framework (i.e. the so-called MFF 2021-2027) are overlapping, this paper aims at casting 
a light on the interlinkage of these two processes and on the interests that lie behind them. 
Keywords: Brexit, Multiannual financial framework (MFF), integration, 
disintegration  
1. Introduction 
Thursday 23 June 2016, the day when the so-called EU referendum took place and 
the United Kingdom voted to leave, undoubtedly represents a milestone in the history of 
the European Union: after decades of continuous deepening and consecutive enlargements, 
this was the first time people of a sovereign member state decided to leave the integration. 
Although it is not yet clear what Brexit means or how it will come about (e.g. what form 
the UK’s post-Brexit trade relationship with the EU might take), the withdrawal process by 
itself is a rare moment of truth in that it brings interests of the different players (member 
states, Commission, sectors, businesses) to the table and provides opportunity to engage in 
a stocktaking exercise and consider alternatives for Europe’s future.   
This paper tries to assess the differences in viewpoints and interests of the main 
stakeholders for the proper understanding of the Brexit negotiations. Special attention will 
be paid to the relationship between Brexit and the current MFF negotiations. We conclude 
the analysis with the presentation of various scenarios for the outcome of the withdrawal 
process. 
1 Paper presented at the 12th Hungarian-Romanian round table, Bucharest, October 11, 2018.  
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2. Neither hard nor soft Brexit is suitable 
In this section, we attempt to highlight a matter of significant controversy that is 
almost impossible to resolve: namely that for the relatively underdeveloped EU member 
states neither a hard Brexit, nor a soft Brexit could fit in with the Commission’s budget 
proposal for 2021-27. To address this controversy, the analysis is carried out in two 
strands: the first is an assessment of the different perceptions and interests regarding the 
UK withdrawal from the European integration, while the second is a bit more creative 
discursive approach, which examines the possible linkages between Brexit and the next 
multiannual financial framework (MFF 2021-27) viewed from the EU’s periphery2 
perspective.  
2.1. Interests and negotiating stances 
On June 23, 2016, people of the United Kingdom voted for Brexit. The assessment 
of differences in Brexit-related interests is delivered at four planes: between capital and 
labour, big corporations and small and medium-sized enterprises, central government and 
devolved administrations, and the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU (EU27).  
It is a fact that Britain’s businesses have, since the mid-1990s, gained significant 
competitive advantage through the use of vast supplies of cheap labour (both skilled and 
unskilled) entering the country first from the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, then, 
in the context of the Eurozone crisis and successive Eastern enlargements, from the EU’s 
Southern and Eastern periphery. Since Brexit is supposed to end free movement, i.e. the 
influx of new cohorts of low-price workers from the EU27, this might consequently lead to 
an increase in wage level of the domestic labour force. As a matter of fact, in parallel to a 
general downturn in labour inflow since referendum and unemployment staying at 4 
percent (a 43-year low), growth in wages has already begun: regular pay was 3.1% higher 
in three months ending in August 2018 than in the same quarter in 2017, the highest 
growth rate since December 2008 (Elliott, 2018). 
More generally, an obvious antagonism of interests concerning Brexit exists 
between the rich and the poor. In the case of a hard Brexit, for example, prices on the 
property market are likely to grow at a slower pace or even fall (especially in metropolitan 
areas and great university cities), which is bad news for homeowners who have enjoyed 
rising prices for years, but a good one for renters and a whole generation who have rightly 
felt they were cut off from the property ladder by ever increasing and unaffordable prices. 
Another important aspect is the development of food prices which are prone to fall. As a 
result of the Common Agricultural Policy and the consequent high tariffs placed on food 
imports, consumer food prices in the UK are pushed up by approximately 17 per cent 
above the level they otherwise would be, i.e. outside the EU’s protectionist customs union 
(TaxPayers’ Alliance, 2018). 
Having all this in mind, it is small wonder that in terms of income stratification these 
are the poorest (i.e. the lowest and the second lowest) deciles, spending relatively more on 
food and housing, who would most benefit (and gain an extra £36 and £44 a week 
2 EU periphery consists of countries entering the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 (except for Malta and 
Cyprus), plus Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. 
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respectively) from a clear Brexit (Leave Means Leave, Labour Leave and Economists for 
Free Trade, 2017).  
The next type of conflict to be dealt with is between large corporates on one hand 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the other. As the former are more 
likely to participate in international trade, for them unfettered access to the European 
single market is of fundamental importance. However, EU legislation and directives have 
to be observed by the latter, too. While regulations impose costs of compliance on all types 
of businesses, these costs do not fall equally on them. SMEs have to deal with relatively 
higher pro rata costs than big companies for several reasons. First, these costs are mostly 
fixed, hence more difficult to be absorbed over a lower turnover base than a larger one. 
Second, as SMEs generally are more price takers than price makers, unlike big companies, 
they can hardly pass onto their customers the costs incurred in complying with EU 
regulations (Chittenden, Ambler, 2015). 
The third type of incompatibility of interest exists between London and the devolved 
administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Sensibilities arise from the fact 
that Brexit presents a fundamental constitutional challenge to the United Kingdom as a 
whole. The devolution settlements were agreed after the UK had become an EU member, 
and the devolved legislatures only got legislative competence in the devolved areas – such 
as support for agriculture and fisheries, state aid for industry, public procurement, 
environmental standards, management of radioactive waste, and some transport issues – as 
long as the rules created by them were compatible with EU law (UK Government, 2017). 
So, in practice, the responsibility for these policy areas has largely been excised at EU 
level for the last couple of decades. However, if there were no changes to the devolution 
settlements, the whole responsibility for the above mentioned areas would automatically 
fall back to the devolved jurisdictions at the moment of Brexit, which could potentially 
lead to regulatory divergence, and thus – by altering the competitive neutrality – 
undermine the integrity of the UK’s internal market (UK Parliament, 2017).  
This is why the UK government was half-compelled, half-inclined to abuse of its 
exclusive competence to conduct international negotiations (i.e. negotiating on behalf of 
the devolved), and to arrange matters in a way that powers – which were, in the context of 
Brexit, to be repatriated from the EU to the UK and might have gone to Belfast, Cardiff 
and Edinburgh – would, at least temporarily, be diverted to London. The European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, first proposed under the title of “Great Repeal Bill” in 2016, 
which – apart from providing for repealing the European Communities Act 1972, is 
destined to secure legal continuity by transposing directly-applicable already-existing EU 
law into UK law – does, in the topic of devolution, apply a temporary ‘freeze’ on the 
devolved administrations “in specified areas, so that in those areas the current parameters 
of devolved competence are maintained” (Department for Exiting the European Union, 
2018). This means that the devolved institutions will temporarily be able to modify 
retained EU law only in ways that remain consistent with the underlying directive. This 
also limits the power of the devolved governments by making it impossible for them to 
retain a piece of EU law that has been modified by London, even if their consent is 
generally needed for such modification to happen. Freezing powers will expire two, the 
regulations themselves five years after Brexit day, if not revoked earlier. 
All this power re-centralisation to London, made in the name of dealing with 
correcting deficiencies, international obligations and the ability to implement any 
withdrawal agreement, caused much disappointment amongst the devolved who originally 
believed they were going to get their rights back faster. The situation is all the more 
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delicate as there are no such things as devolved “English Parliament” or “English 
Government”, the UK parliament and the UK government also operating as parliament and 
government for England. On top if this duality, in the case of certain devolved 
competences, there are clear differences in interests between England and the rest of the 
UK. In agriculture, for example – flowing from differences in natural endowments (the 
share of “areas of natural constraint” being 85 percent in Scotland, 81 in Wales, and 70 in 
Northern Ireland, while only 17 percent in England), but also from differences in farm and 
production structure (England being dominated by large, productive farms largely present 
in profitable horticulture, while small farms being predominant in Wales and Northern 
Ireland, and big but extensive ones in Scotland) – farmers in the devolved nations are 
much more dependent on CAP subsidies (between 75 and 87 percent of farm income 
coming from CAP) than in England (around 50 percent) (Keating, 2018).  
Having all this in mind, as well as the prospect of phasing out direct payments by 
2027, drafted in UK’s new agricultural Bill of September 2018 (UK government, 2018), 
there is room for thinking that UK policymaking is influenced by the needs of agriculture 
in England, rather than those in devolved nations. Consequently, it would be a most critical 
step towards creating a climate of trust if the existing population-based method of 
allocation of funding to the devolved (the so-called ‘Barnett formula’) were replaced with 
a more appropriate, needs-based funding arrangement. Only in such a way could the 
devolved be compensated for the loss of EU funding, caused by Brexit in the long-term. 
No wonder: a report to the House of Lords found the impact of Brexit on UK’s devolution 
settlements to be incontestably “one of the most technically complex and politically 
contentious elements” of the whole withdrawal process (UK Parliament, 2017). 
Finally, there are differences in interests between the United Kingdom and the EU27 
who are being represented by the Commission in Brexit negotiations. Normally, there 
should not be any major conflicts, as both sides are supposed to serve the interests of their 
electorate, hence focus on protecting jobs and businesses. By contrast, enduring 
differences in negotiating parties' main objectives and, consequently, their negotiating 
stances make the achievement of this logical and coherent set of goals, at the least, 
challenging. What is it all about? 
The British, given their confidence in the long-run potential of their economy, 
prioritise a bespoke agreement, “securing the freest and most frictionless trade possible in 
goods and services between the UK and the EU” (UK Government, 2017). But the main 
purposes (and promises) of Brexit – i.e. taking back control over laws, borders, and money, 
which consists of ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in, the free 
movement of workers to, and the substantial funding of the EU budget by the UK – seem 
to be in stark contradiction to the European Council’s guidelines for the negotiations. The 
latter do not only say that – departing from the integrity of the single European market and 
the inseparability of the four freedoms (i.e. the free movement of goods, capital, services, 
and labour) – they consider “cherry picking” any attempt aiming at an "à la carte" divorce, 
but rather argues that „a non-member of the Union … cannot have the same rights and 
enjoy the same benefits as a member” (Consilium, 2017). In other words, the Commission 
cannot let the UK profit from leaving the EU with an advantageous deal, because if Brexit 
is not deterrent enough, regarding its consequences for the British economy, to stop other 
member states from reconsidering their own situation within the integration, this could lead 
to further disintegration, and eventually to the end of the European project.       
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2.2. MFF 2021-27 and Brexit 
On May 2, 2018, a draft proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
covering the next seven-year period (2021-2027) was published by the Commission. The 
very essence of the MFF is to design the structure of, and set ceilings for the annual EU 
budgets of the forthcoming (post-2020) seven-year period. In other words, it determines 
the yearly amount of funds that can be spent on each and every of the common policies and 
programs (adding up in the so-called headings). According to EU tradition, annual limits to 
spending under the different budget headings are expressed in two forms: as commitments 
(i.e. legally binding promises to spend money) on the one hand, and payments (i.e. actual 
amounts authorized for disbursement from the EU budget in a given year) on the other 
hand. 
The draft also deals with the revenue side of the EU budget by proposing changes to 
the structure of the so-called Own Resource System (ORS), and the way in which its 
components are calculated. Although, unlike MFF regulations, decisions on ORS apply 
indefinitely rather than for specific MFF periods, now a need arises to reshape the ORS for 
the post-2020 period with Brexit making redundant the British rebate, as well as the related 
correction mechanisms. Both MFF and ORS are decided by the Council acting 
unanimously; but while a decision on the MFF demands the consent of the European 
Parliament (EP), in the case of the ORS, the EP has only a consulting legislative role. If 
there is no agreement, everything goes on according to the rules of the previous budgetary 
cycle, which means that one twelfth of the budget appropriations for the previous year 
may, as a maximum, be spent each month for any chapter of the common budget. 
As for the Commission’s basic document (European Commission, 2018a) with 
regard to the next MFF, there are two important and interrelated issues that deserve 
attention. First, Commission’s proposals are based on the assumption of a hard Brexit as 
they do not include a contribution from the United Kingdom. Second, while there is no 
significant change in the size of the budget, its structure is transformed: significantly more 
funds will be available under headings deemed to support investment in modernization 
(research/innovation/digitization, youth/education, climate and environmental protection), 
and in programs which are politically unavoidable (migration/border protection, security 
policy). Meanwhile – as the press release accompanying the Commission's proposal 
(European Commission, 2018b) states – a moderate reduction of approximately 5 percent 
would apply to both the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy (CP), 
compounded by a proposed increase of national co-financing rates. In the view of the 
Commission, the hole in the budget resulting from the United Kingdom's departure should 
be plugged partly by new resources (drawn from the relaunched Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base, revenues of the EU’s Emissions Trading System, and contributions 
calculated on the amount of non-recycled plastic packaging waste), and partly by savings 
(e.g. from halving the amount member states can keep when collecting customs duties) and 
redeployments from existing (i.e. CAP and CP) programmes (European Commission, 
2018a). 
The point is that the decrease of 5 percent in funds available for the CAP and CP is 
calculated in current prices, but in practice a change of a quite different order of magnitude 
is to be expected. Concerning cohesion spending, countries in EU’s periphery, especially 
those of Central Europe and the Baltic region having entered the EU in the 2004 
enlargement round, would be badly affected: in their case, allocations available within the 
cohesion policy framework could, in real terms, typically be reduced by between 22 and 24 
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percent (Figure 1). However, it is to be remembered that all these member states belong to 
the bottom half of the ranking for their average GDP per capita, and not less than 4 
Hungarian and 5 Polish regions happen to be among the 20 poorest in Europe (Eurostat, 
2018).   
Figure 1 Planned changes in Cohesion Policy allocations by Member States (%) for 2021-2027 
Source: Lemaitre (2018). 
With regard to agricultural subsidies, the proposed 5 percent reduction in current 
prices for the period of 2021-27 (vis-a-vis the period of 2014-20) corresponds to a decrease 
of more than 16 percent in real terms at a yearly average. And, by the end of the next MFF, 
the support level could fall by more than 28 percent below to what it was 20 years earlier 
(i.e. from €61.3 bn in 2007 to €44 bn in 2027) (Carles, 2018). At this point of the analysis, 
it should be recalled that EU rules concerning the single market and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) were applied rather selectively in countries acceding to the EU 
since 1995, and especially most ungenerously in countries of the several rounds of Eastern 
enlargement. At the time of the so-called the EFTA enlargement, due to the already 
existence of the single market, farmers in the new member states (Austria, Sweden and 
Finland) became immediately (i.e. from the very first year of membership) eligible to 
receive all CAP support. By contrast, agricultural direct subsidies were fully extended to 
the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (plus Malta and Cyprus) only at the 
end of a 10-year transitional period. In addition, by the time their payments reached 100 
percent of the level they were eligible to apply for under normal regime (i.e. by 2013), 
CAP reform containing successive reductions in direct support had already been under 
way. This tendency is to be accelerated in the future, if Commission’s proposals for post 
2020 CAP are accepted. 
If we have a look at the data which have already been published by Eurostat (i.e. for the 
period of 2014-17) concerning expenditures from the current MFF (2014-20), we can see 
that peripheral countries can typically draw on a much higher proportion of the cohesion 
and agricultural money than on those available under the competitiveness (especially 
research/innovation) headings (Table 1). This means that the Commission is vainly trying 
to reallocate an ever-growing share of the budgetary resources towards programs 
representing modernity and progress, and allegedly more effective in this respect than the 
cohesion and agricultural policies, if the EU periphery is not competitive enough to win 
masses of those grants. 
To sum up: given that disparities in wages and living standards among member states of 
the East and West of the EU have remained significant, and there is, since the 2008 crisis, 
a widening gap between the North and the South too, Commission’s proposals concerning 
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EU budgetary spending on cohesion and agriculture for the next MFF (2021-27) do not 
seem to set an example of solidarity, as, if accepted and codified, they would further 
reduce rather than increase the funding for programs which can relatively more easily be 
made good use of by the less developed.   
Table 1: Peripheral countries' share in EU budget expenditure on different common 
policies (2014-17) 
Common policies 
(1) 
Periphery 
countries 
(P) 
(2) 
P 
withou
t Spain 
(3) 
P 
(4) 
P 
without 
Spain 
(5) 
P 
(6) 
P 
without 
Spain 
(7) 
Competitiveness for 
growth and jobs 
13,6% 8,2% 1,00 1,00 - - 
Horizon 2020 10,7% 5,8% - - 1,00 1,00 
Economic, social and 
territorial cohesion 
64,8% 56,3% 4,77 6,88 6,06 9,70 
Common agricultural 
and fisheries policies 
35,1% 26,3% 2,58 3,22 3,28 4,53 
Note: Periphery (P) consists of 15 countries of which Spain is just one. Spain is 
relatively bigger and more successful in obtaining money from different EU policies (for 
instance Competitiveness, especially from Horizon 2020) therefore columns 2 and 3 
underscore how small the Periphery share would be without reckoning Spain in it. 
Columns 5 and 7 show how many times the Periphery (without Spain) can obtain more 
money from CAP or CP than from Competitiveness or Horizon 2020. Results are 
considerably higher than in columns 4 and 6 respectively (with Spain). 
Source: European Commission (2018c). 
What may make it even more difficult for the EU periphery to accept Commission’s 
draft proposals for the next MFF is the prospect of a ‘hard Brexit’. The latter can obviously 
cause serious damages to existing trade relations between the United Kingdom and the 
EU27. Namely, supply chains (e.g. in the automotive industry) and the whole agri-food 
business could be hit very hard, as some member states of the EU periphery depend 
heavily on exports to Britain directly or indirectly (e.g. through the German automotive 
industry). 
Interestingly, it is unlikely that a ‘soft Brexit’ would for the peripheral countries be 
any more acceptable than a hard one, if it meant the United Kingdom could continue to 
have access to the European single market without having to continue with its huge annual 
financial contribution to the common budget – one of the core issues of the referendum. As 
a matter of fact, at the time of previous enlargements and/or deepening of the integration 
process, less developed countries of the periphery used to seek and receive significant 
compensation from the common budget in exchange for further market liberalization.3 
3 E.g. accessions of Spain and Portugal in 1986 were threatened by a Greek veto if the integration did not 
adopt special programs to protect its farmers from the impending competition coming from the new 
entrants. The Integrated Mediterranean Programs, designed to help southern regions of the then 
Community (including the whole of Greece) to adjust to the new situation, were based on provisions that 
would later become the core of the Cohesion policy. By the same token, the Cohesion Fund was created 
in order to counter a threat carried out by four governments of the integration periphery (namely those of 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) to veto the Maastricht Treaty unless a new financial instrument was 
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That is, with such a soft Brexit, a traditional principle would be harmed, and the interests 
of the periphery would be damaged. 
3. What sort of Brexit is likely to emerge? 
To understand what has happened with British withdrawal so far, and why, it is 
important to see that the interests of the economic-political-media-scholar/adviser elite, the 
Establishment in both Britain and the EU27, would be very adversely affected by any sort 
of Brexit. The latter is commonly perceived as a dangerous precedent, a first chapter of a 
potential disintegration of the European Union. Therefore, since the beginning of the exit 
process, there has been a consistent endeavor of both elites to soften/ignore the main 
claims of the Leave campaign (i.e. regaining control over laws, borders, trade and money), 
and demean and discredit politicians and experts working for a clean Brexit (i.e. the UK 
leaving both the single market and the customs union). This is no wonder if we keep in 
mind that, in Britain, the withdrawal negotiations and the whole process is overseen by a 
prime minister who voted Remain, and her cabinet where two third of the ministers did so. 
Prospects for a clean Brexit have dimmed right from the very beginning of the 
withdrawal (so-called Article 50) negotiations, as the British team agreed to adopt the 
phased approach advocated by the Commission. This meant that talks could not start on 
future relationship between the EU and the UK until there was not sufficient progress on 
the main withdrawal issues (i.e. citizens’ rights, exit bill, the Irish border, and some 
others)4.  
Chances for a correct deal were further weakened in December 2017, when the 
negotiating parties published the so-called Joint Report, containing a backstop clause 
which would ensure unrestricted flow of trade and people through the land border between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland even in the absence of an agreement on future relations. The 
backstop meant that Northern Ireland would remain in the EU's trading and regulatory 
system, which would compromise the integrity of the UK’s internal market. 
The Chequers Plan, a key white paper presented by the UK government in July 
2018, can be seen as the ultimate blow to a clean Brexit. According to the plan, the United 
Kingdom should continue to respect the EU regulations for goods (including agri-foods), 
state aids and competition policy without having a say over them, and would remain under 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (at least for the interpretation of the 
European case law) forever. The publication of the Chequers Plan provoked the resignation 
of both foreign secretary Boris Johnson, and Brexit secretary David Davis, two of the few 
Brexiteers in the Theresa May cabinet.        
In the light of the above, it is not surprising if, according to the present situation, in 
late October 2018, chances for a very soft Brexit are gaining ground. The United 
Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU is likely to take place only after a protracted transition 
period, if ever. During the transition, the country would, as a quasi-member state, virtually 
remain subject to every law and regulations of the European Union (single market, 
customs union, etc.) without being able to have an impact on them. Such a protracted 
established to help the less developed member states in their efforts to meet the criteria of the would-be 
single market (Brunazzo, 2016). 
4 Nobody seemed to be bothered by the impossibility of the mission to agree on the openness of the Irish 
border without knowing what sort of trade relations would link the two sides of the border. 
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version of Brexit would certainly suit to the most influential actors of the European 
economy, but leave millions of British voters frustrated and unsatisfied. Therefore, it 
cannot be ruled out that the process gets complicated, slowed down or even interrupted 
because of unforeseen changes in UK home affairs. This might lead to Britain leaving the 
bloc without a deal and falling back on WTO rules for trade with the EU, or sorting out a 
Canada-style free trade agreement following an agreed extension of the Article 50 
negotiations. 
4. Conclusion 
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union seems to be a 
complex and difficult process in itself. As a matter of fact, negotiations are overlapping 
with those, not less complex and complicated, about EU’s Multiannual Financial 
Framework for the post-2020 period. Today, nobody can with certainty predict the 
outcome of either of the processes. However some sort of solution will sooner or later 
appear on the horizon in both cases. Only one thing is sure: either hard or soft Brexit takes 
place, countries of the EU periphery had better to wait for the end results of the withdrawal 
negotiations, and only then when the Brexit process will have unfolded to enter the 
substantive part of the discussion over the proposals for the 2021-27 MFF.  
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